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I. INTRODUCTION
HE most significant civil evidence developments in 1999 again oc-
curred in the field of expert testimony. Federal and state courts
grappled with the vague gatekeeping standards for expert testi-
mony created by Daubert and Robinson. Predictably, the cases decided
during the survey period provided trial judges with few clear directions.
Another area of important development was privileges. For the first
time, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the scope of rule 507 (trade
secret privilege) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. Other cases of note
dealt with relevance and hearsay exceptions. This article cannot encom-
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Methodist University School of Law, 1990. Michael Shore is a partner with the firm of
Shore*Fineberg, L.L.P., in Dallas, Texas. He specializes in complex civil litigation, repre-
senting plaintiffs in medical malpractice, catastrophic personal injury, and complex com-
mercial cases. The author would like to thank Kenneth Shore, a recent graduate of SMU
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pass every development in the area of civil evidence, nor include every
interesting case, but I hope that it will give the reader some idea of the
significant developments in civil evidence during the last survey period.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. DAUBERT AND ROBINSON
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' and its progeny again
dominated the civil evidence landscape in 1999. In Daubert, the United
States Supreme Court interpreted rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence to "assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's
testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at
hand."'2 The Daubert court listed several factors that trial judges may
consider when determining if the scientific testimony is reliable:
(1) whether the theory or technique has been scientifically tested;
(2) whether the theory or technique has been published or subject to
peer review;
(3) the error rate of a particular technique; and
(4) acceptance of the theory in the scientific community.3
The Daubert court cautioned that these factors were not a "definitive
checklist or test," 4 and that the gatekeeping inquiry must be "tied to the
facts" of a particular case.5 By making the analysis extremely flexible,
Daubert allows trial courts to decide what factors to consider on a case by
case basis. This flexibility has led to as many interpretations of Daubert
as there are trial judges, replacing the common sense of six or twelve
jurors with that one judge.
Two years after the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert, the
Texas Supreme Court, in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson,6
adopted Daubert's reliability and relevancy requirements for determining
the admissibility of scientific expert testimony under Texas Rule of Evi-
dence 702. Justice Gonzalez stated in Robinson that the increasing use of
experts and the potential prejudicial impact of their testimony on a jury
gives the trial judge a "heightened responsibility to ensure that expert
testimony show some indicia of reliability."'7 Citing Daubert, the Robin-
son court held that Texas rule 702 requires the proponent of expert testi-
mony to show that the testimony is both scientifically reliable and
relevant.8
1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. Id. at 597. Rule 702 states: "If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. Evio. 702.
3. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
4. Id. at 593.
5. Id. at 591 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)).
6. 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
7. Id. at 553.
8. See id. at 555-56.
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The Texas Supreme Court, however, was not satisfied with Daubert's
four factors. It prescribed its own list of six non-exclusive factors trial
courts should consider when determining the admissibility of expert testi-
mony under Texas rule 702:
(1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested;
(2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective inter-
pretation of the expert;
(3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or
publication;
(4) the technique's potential rate of error;
(5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally ac-
cepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and
(6) the non-judicial uses that have been made of the theory or
technique.9
The court added that a particular case may require a trial court to con-
sider other factors to determine scientific reliability. 10 Thus, Robinson's
factors are not exclusive.
The Robinson court added two factors that can also weigh against ad-
missibility-the extent to which the theory or technique depends upon
subjective interpretation and the non-judicial uses that have been made
of the technique." Thus, the Robinson test is more restrictive than
Daubert and further diminishes the role of the jury.12 The Texas Supreme
Court appears to be telling judges that subjective expert interpretations
are not to be trusted. Rarely is there only one reasonable conclusion to
be drawn from the data examined by the experts in a case. Thus, almost
all expert interpretations are to some extent subjective. Almost any time
a case involves conflicting expert testimony, the conflict is based upon the
subjective interpretation of data by the opposing experts. Robinson dem-
onstrates that the Texas Supreme Court either ignores or misunderstands
that reality.
During the survey period, both the federal and state courts issued opin-
ions attempting to clarify Daubert and Robinson.
B. THE FEDERAL DECISIONS
While it was clear that Daubert applied to scientific testimony, jurisdic-
tions were divided as to whether Daubert applied to the testimony of en-
9. Id. at 557.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See Honorable Robert McGrath & Paula R. Moore, Taller and Better Looking
Judges in Texas, 3 TEX. WESL. L. REV. 367 (1997). Judge Robert McGrath, a State District
Judge in Fort Worth, points out that the Robinson court adopted a middle-of-the-road
approach, lying somewhere between the earlier rigid general acceptance standard set forth
in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and the liberal relevancy standard in
Daubert. See 3 TEX. WESL. L. REV. at 387.
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gineers and other experts who were not scientists. 13 The United States
Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Kumho Tire Co., LTD, v. Carmi-
chael.14 In Kumho Tire, the Court held that Daubert's "gatekeeping"
duty applies to all expert testimony-including testimony based on "tech-
nical" and "other specialized" knowledge. 15
The Kumho Tire court reemphasized that the reliability test is a flexible
one 16 and the factors listed in Daubert may not be pertinent in assessing
the reliability of a particular expert's testimony. 17 The trial judge should
not, therefore, limit the analysis to Daubert's list of factors. Instead, the
judge should determine whether the expert testimony is both reliable and
relevant, based upon a "rational methodology" specific to each case.' 8
The Court emphasized that under Daubert, the district court's responsi-
bility "is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the
same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert
in the relevant field."' 9 The inclusion of personal experience and subjec-
tive observation as non-suspect bases for expert testimony directly con-
tradicts the Texas Supreme Court's more rigid position.
In Kumho Tire, the Court applied the abuse of discretion standard,
which is used to review the trial judge's decision as to whether expert
testimony is relevant and reliable, to the appellate court's review of the
trial judge's method of making that determination. 20 The Kumho Tire
opinion made it clear that appellate review should focus first on the
method used for determining relevancy and reliability and then on the
ultimate decision stemming from that method's application to the evi-
dence. As long as the trial court uses a method that is not arbitrary or
13. The Fifth Circuit had already held that Daubert applies to all expert testimony.
See Watkins v. Telsmith, 121 F.3d 984, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at
592-93) ("Not every guidepost outlined in Daubert will necessarily apply to expert testi-
mony based on engineering principles and practical experience, but the district court's
'preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testi-
mony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue' is no less important."). The Texas Supreme Court had also
ruled in 1998 that the Daubert/Robinson relevance and reliability requirements apply
equally to all types of expert testimony. See Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972
S.W.2d 713, 726 (Tex. 1998) ("All expert testimony should be shown to be reliable before it
is admitted.").
14. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
15. Id. at 138.
16. See id. at 150.
17. See id. ("[Daubert] made it clear that its list of factors was meant to be helpful, not
definitive.").
18. See id. at 149 ("And whether the specific expert testimony focuses on specialized
observations, the specialized translation of those observations into theory, a specialized
theory itself, or the application of such a theory in a particular case, the expert's testimony
often will 'rest upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to [the jury's] own."').
19. Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
20. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. ("That [abuse of discretion] standard applies as




capricious in reviewing expert testimony for relevancy and reliability, the
trial court's decision on admissibility should stand on appeal.
The Supreme Court refused to draw any distinctions between types of
experts. It reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court's earlier holding that the
trial judge should consider the Daubert factors only "where an expert
'relies on the application of scientific principles,' but not where an expert
relies 'on skill or experienced-based observation."21 The Court provided
examples of instances in which Daubert factors might be relevant when
assessing the reliability of experience-based testimony and concluded that
it would be inappropriate to segregate expertise by type and prescribe
certain factors to consider for each type. 22 "Life and the legal cases that
it generates are too complex to warrant such a definitive match. '23
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided several cases during the
survey period clarifying the Daubert test as applied in the Fifth Circuit.
In Black v. Food Lion, Inc.,24 decided shortly after Kumho Tire, the Fifth
Circuit explained how trial courts should apply Daubert to "non-scien-
tific" evidence. The court, citing Kumho Tire, held that a proper Daubert
analysis requires the trial court to first consider the Daubert factors, then
consider "whether other factors, not mentioned in Daubert, are relevant
to the case at hand."25
In Black, the plaintiff slipped and fell on a supermarket floor. The
plaintiff presented the testimony of Dr. Mary Reyna, a board certified
specialist in treating persistent pain. Dr. Reyna testified that the plaintiff
suffered from fibromyalgia syndrome. Fibromyalgia syndrome is a condi-
tion characterized by generalized pain, poor sleep, an inability to concen-
trate, and chronic fatigue. After ruling out other possible causes of the
plaintiff's fibromyalgia, Dr. Reyna determined that it was caused by "hor-
monal changes" resulting from the fall.26 Based upon the evidence, in-
cluding Dr. Reyna's testimony, the magistrate judge awarded the plaintiff
nearly $300,000 in damages.
Because the magistrate misapplied the Daubert factors and failed to
articulate any other factors it considered in carrying out its gatekeeper
function,27 the Fifth Circuit conducted its own Daubert analysis and con-
cluded that the magistrate abused his discretion in admitting the expert's
testimony. Dr. Reyna's theory failed under all four factors listed in
Daubert. Her theory had not been tested or published, and thus, not peer
reviewed. Furthermore, the medical literature contradicted her theory.
Under Black, therefore, a trial court that determines the Daubert fac-
tors are not appropriate in a particular case must carefully design a logi-




24. 171 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1999).
25. Id. at 312.
26. Id. at 309.
27. See id. at 312.
2000]
SMU LAW REVIEW
cally-supportable method to determine what non-Daubert factors it will
consider regarding the reliability of expert testimony. Those factors must
be clearly articulated in the record. The evidence must then be examined
against those factors, with the trial court's conclusion as to reliability
clearly explained.
Tanner v. Westbrook2 8 is another Fifth Circuit case in which the trial
court failed to articulate its methodology for determining reliability. Tan-
ner teaches that when a lawyer's expert is challenged under Daubert, the
lawyer should request the trial court to clearly articulate its gatekeeper
analysis in the record.
In Tanner, the Fifth Circuit vacated a $3,200,000 jury verdict in favor of
the family of a severely brain-damaged infant and remanded the case for
a new trial. The court based its decision on the trial court's admission of
expert testimony on causation. The plaintiffs' two experts testified that
birth asphyxia, which began shortly before Jennifer Tanner's delivery,
caused her cerebral palsy. The plaintiffs' experts also testified that the
defendants failed to properly treat Jennifer's birth asphyxia and that their
failure caused or at least contributed to her injury. The experts' opinions
were based upon their personal knowledge, medical training, and medical
literature. All parties conceded that the child suffered birth asphyxia.
The only disputed issue was whether the birth asphyxia or an earlier
event caused her brain injury.
The defendants requested a hearing under Federal Rule of Evidence
104(a) 2 9 in an effort to exclude the plaintiffs' experts' testimony.30 In affi-
davits, the defendants' experts stated that the cerebral palsy-causing
event occurred in utero some time before the child's birth. They sup-
ported their opinions with peer-reviewed medical literature stating that
birth asphyxia rarely causes cerebral palsy and that doctors are unable to
determine the cause of many cerebral palsy cases. The court also cited
28. 174 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 1999).
29. Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) states that "[p]reliminary questions concerning
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibil-
ity of evidence shall be determined by the court." See also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592
("Faced with a proffer of expert testimony,. . . the trial judge must determine at the outset
pursuant to FEo. R. Evii. 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact at issue.
This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or methodology properly
can be applied to the facts at issue.").
30. The trial court denied the defendant's rule 104 motion and stated that it would
pass on the experts' qualifications at trial. The court then overruled the defendant's objec-
tion to the experts' testimony at trial. Consequently, there were no specific findings as to
the issue of the admissibility of the experts' testimony. The Fifth Circuit essentially under-
took its own Daubert analysis based only on the materials submitted by both sides regard-
ing the defendant's motion for a rule 104 hearing. The court did not review the evidence
presented at trial. The Tenth Circuit criticized this approach in Kinser v. Gehl Co., 184
F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 985 (Jan. 24, 2000), stating that in cases
where the appellate court has no findings to review, the court should look at the entire




medical literature stating that cerebral palsy caused by birth asphyxia is
usually accompanied by organ damage, and no organ damage was present
in this case. Finally, the defendants' experts testified that the child's
symptoms demonstrated that congenital defects probably caused the
child's cerebral palsy.
The plaintiffs' two experts submitted affidavits opposing the motion
and stating that there was no evidence of a congenital defect, and as a
result, they had eliminated such a defect as a possible cause of the cere-
bral palsy. The doctors also stated that the lack of damage to vital organs
was consistent with their opinion that the child's brain injury occurred
after birth. While the plaintiffs provided medical literature supporting
their experts' conclusion that asphyxia can cause cerebral palsy-a fact
that was not disputed-they did not provide medical literature supporting
their experts' opinion as to the reason for the lack of organ damage.
The Fifth Circuit ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in ad-
mitting the testimony of one of the plaintiffs' experts, Dr. Nestrud. The
court pointed out that Dr. Nestrud could not rule out the possibility of a
genetic cause and that he lacked a background in the specific study of the
causes of cerebral palsy. The plaintiffs presented the court with medical
literature supporting Dr. Nestrud's opinion that birth asphyxia causes
cerebral palsy, and the appellate panel did not find that admission of the
plaintiffs' other expert's testimony to that fact was an abuse of discretion.
The opinion concedes that birth asphyxia can cause cerebral palsy and
that Dr. Nestrud is experienced in treating infants with birth asphyxia. 31
It is therefore not clear from the opinion why Dr. Nestrud's testimony-
that with proper treatment the infant would not have suffered her in-
jury-was unreliable and its admission by the trial court "manifestly erro-
neous. ' 32 Tanner seems to establish that an abuse of discretion is possible
if the panel hearing the appeal merely disagrees with the trial court's ulti-
mate decision, which is clearly not a proper application of the abuse of
discretion standard.
The court seems to mix the issues of whether the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting Dr. Nestrud's testimony with the issue of whether,
if the court had abused its discretion, the error was harmful. The real
difference between Dr. Nestrud's testimony and the testimony of the
plaintiffs' other expert was the other expert's effectiveness. The court
notes early in the opinion that Dr. Nestrud testified that if Jennifer had
been properly treated, she "would not have the brain damage that she has
now."33 The other expert, however, merely stated that the child "would
have done better" 34 if properly treated. The Fifth Circuit's determination
of abuse of discretion, based in part on the effectiveness of the testimony,
31. See Tanner, 174 F.3d at 548.
32. See Watkins v. Telsmith, 121 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he discretion of the
trial judge and his or her decision will not be disturbed on appeal 'unless manifestly
erroneous.'").
33. Tanner, 174 F.3d at 546.
34. Id. at 549.
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reveals its outcome-oriented analysis. The abuse of discretion analysis
should not reference the effectiveness of the evidence, only its reliability
and relevance.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's exclusion of expert testi-
mony in Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc.35 In Curtis, workers at a Missis-
sippi refinery sued their employer and E.I. du Pont de Nemours and
Company for damages that they claimed had resulted from overexposure
to benzene at the refinery. The workers sought to introduce the testi-
mony of Dr. Frank Stevens, a Ph.D. in environmental science, whose tes-
timony linked the workers' symptoms to their benzene exposure. Despite
Dr. Stevens's extensive experience in the areas of industrial hygiene, oc-
cupational safety, and toxicology, the trial court excluded his testimony,
holding that it did not satisfy Daubert. The trial court agreed that an
abundance of scientific and medical literature supported a causal connec-
tion between exposure to benzene and the workers' symptoms. Further-
more, during the hearing, the trial court heard evidence that the workers
were directly exposed to benzene while working at the factory and that
the amount of benzene in the air around the refinery was at least ten
times the amount permitted by Occupational Health and Safety Adminis-
tration (OSHA) regulations. The trial court, however, excluded Dr. Ste-
vens's testimony because he had failed to demonstrate with sufficient
certainty the exact amount of benzene to which the workers were ex-
posed and to eliminate other possible causes for the workers'
symptoms. 36
The Fifth Circuit held that the trial court abused its discretion in ex-
cluding Dr. Stevens's testimony. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Moore v.
Ashland Chemical, Inc.,37 in which it held that because the plaintiffs' ex-
pert had only a "paucity of facts" concerning the level of Toluene to
which the plaintiffs may have been exposed, his causation opinion was
inadmissible. In Curtis, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that "the law does
not require Plaintiffs to show the precise level of benzene to which they
were exposed. '38 Dr. Stevens testified that the workers were exposed to
levels of benzene several hundred times the level permitted by OSHA.
This fact, combined with other evidence, gave Dr. Stevens much more
than a mere "paucity of facts" to support his conclusion.3 9
In summary, Curtis provides guidance on the quantity of facts neces-
sary to establish a reasonable basis for an expert's opinion in a toxic ex-
posure case. Plaintiffs are not required to show the precise levels of a
35. 174 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1999).
36. See id. at 670.
37. 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998).
38. Curtis, 174 F.3d at 671.
39. See id. at 670-72. The workers testified about direct exposure to benzene while
working at the factory and about the close temporal connection between the exposure and
the onset of symptoms. Dr. Stevens testified that the design of the factory, which was built
to refine light sweet crude and not highly-toxic chemicals such as benzene, would result in
exposure levels many times that allowed by OSHA.
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harmful chemical to which they are exposed. Scientific knowledge about
the level of exposure to a chemical that is harmful, plus knowledge that
the plaintiffs were exposed to such levels, are sufficient facts to carry the
plaintiff's burden. 40
Attorneys can increase the chances that their expert's opinion will be
admitted by carefully limiting the scope of the testimony. For example, in
Bartley v. Euclid, Inc.,41 five workers sued the manufacturer of a short-
nosed hauler that the workers drove at their job. The workers claimed
that the hauler's design caused excessive vibration and vertical movement
of the cab, resulting in cumulative, repetitive compression fractures of the
workers' spines. The manufacturer appealed the judgment, claiming,
among other things, that the plaintiffs' radiology expert's causation testi-
mony was erroneously admitted.
The Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's decision to allow the testi-
mony, noting that the radiologist did not testify that the haulers caused
the injuries. He merely identified a pattern of injuries common to all of
the drivers. The radiologist examined magnetic resonance images
(MRIs) from the five plaintiffs as well as those of eighty-five other drivers
of short-nosed haulers. From those MRIs, a common pattern of cumula-
tive, repetitive compression fractures emerged. The radiologist compared
this pattern of injuries to MRIs of other back patients, noting that the
other back patients did not have the same type of multiple fractures. The
radiologist concluded that this pattern was a "fingerprint" of the occupa-
tion. He did not testify about the haulers or whether they caused the
workers' injuries. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the radiologist's testi-
mony was merely a comparison of otherwise admissible findings and ex-
hibits.42 Therefore, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in its
admission. 43
Because the admissibility of an expert's testimony under Kumho Tire
depends upon whether he employs the "same level of intellectual rigor
that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field,"' 44 the
field in which the expert practices is critical to the trial court's analysis.
In Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, Inc. ,'45 the plaintiff, who
was suing her former employer for sexual harassment, introduced a psy-
chiatrist's testimony that her headaches, vomiting, and nightmares re-
sulted from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression stemming from
the harassment. After a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant ap-
pealed, complaining that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
the psychiatrist's testimony.
40. See id. at 670 (citing Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir.
1996)).
41. 180 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1999).
42. See id. at 179.
43. See id.
44. Id. (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.).
45. 188 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1999).
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The defense claimed that the psychiatrist's testimony did not satisfy the
factors listed in Daubert. Citing Kumho Tire, the Fifth Circuit explained
that "whether the Daubert factors apply to any given testimony depends
on the nature of the issue at hand, the witness's particular expertise, and
the subject of the testimony. It is a fact specific inquiry. '46 The psychia-
trist testified about his experience, the criteria under which he diagnosed
the plaintiff, and the standard methods of diagnosis in his field. Because
there was no indication that the psychiatrist's testimony amounted to
"junk science" or that he did not employ the "same level of intellectual
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field,"'47
there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Experts in fields such
as psychiatry are more likely to be able to give opinions based upon sub-
jective criteria if those subjective determinations characterize the practice
of an expert in that field.4 8
Another interesting point in Skidmore was the defendants' appeal of
the trial court's decision to allow the psychiatrist to testify that he did not
think the plaintiff had lied to him or fabricated her symptoms. The de-
fendants argued that credibility assessments fall solely within the prov-
ince of the jury. The Fifth Circuit, however, explained that the
psychiatrist "in no way testified that [the plaintiff] was undoubtedly tell-
ing the truth; instead, he merely opined that her symptoms and recollec-
tion appeared to be genuine and that he felt that he had not been 'duped'
by her."4 9
In the last federal case of note from the survey period, the Fifth Circuit
stated that the reliability of tests proscribed by the legislature or a regula-
tory agency may not be challenged under Daubert. In Rushing v. Kansas
City Southern Railway Co.,50 homeowners sued the railway in state court
for nuisance, claiming that a railway switchyard constructed fifty-five feet
from their home produced excessive noise and vibration. The defendants
removed the case to federal court, claiming that the Federal Noise Con-
trol Act preempted the state law claims. Regulations promulgated under
that act set the maximum decibel level for train operations as well as the
procedures to follow in conducting sound-level tests to determine regula-
tory compliance. The defendant's expert conducted sound tests at the
plaintiffs' home as prescribed under the regulations and found that the
decibel level did not exceed the allowed level. The defendants moved for
partial summary judgment on the claims of excessive noise and vibration
based upon the expert's tests. The district court granted the defendant's
motion.
On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the reliability of the testing used by
the defendant's audiology expert. The Fifth Circuit, however, refused to
46. Id. at 618.
47. Id. (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152).
48. See id.
49. Id. at 618.
50. 185 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 1999).
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entertain any objection to reliability of a test that was mandated by the
relevant law:
When applicable law mandates the use of a particular test, the pro-
ponent of the test's results should not have to establish its reliability.
Even if the opponent could prove that it is unreliable, it would be
unfair to the proponent to exclude his expert evidence based on the
mandated technique. Rather, its reliability is irrebuttably presumed.
Any other rule would place the proponent in the untenable position
of being unable to prove compliance with applicable law because he
could not introduce the results of the tests mandated by that same
law.51
While the reliability of tests proscribed by the legislature or a regula-
tory agency may not be challenged, the Rushing court stated that oppo-
nents of the evidence may challenge the expert's compliance with the
prescribed technique. 52 If the proponent's expert did not follow that
technique, then the proponent would have the burden of establishing the
reliability of any alternative technique under Daubert.53
Rushing is also important for its explanation of challenges to an ex-
pert's qualifications. While the defendant's expert had a Ph.D. in audi-
ology and twenty-nine years of experience in conducting sound level
measurements in industry and communities, he had little experience in
conducting outdoor environmental tests of railroad sounds. The Fifth
Circuit rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the expert was not quali-
fied, though, stating "[a]s long as some reasonable indication of qualifica-
tions is adduced, the court may admit the evidence without abdicating its
gate-keeping function. '54 "After that," the court added, "qualifications
become an issue for the trier of fact .... 55 Rushing appears to give great
latitude to trial courts in determining qualifications of an expert who tes-
tifies as to basic scientific or technological principles, even if the expert
has little experience in applying that science or technology to the specific
area at issue.
C. THE STATE DECISIONS
During the previous survey period, the Texas Supreme Court held in
Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc.56 that "Rule 702's fundamental
requirements of reliability and relevance are applicable to all expert testi-
mony offered under that rule."'57 During the current survey period, the
Texas appellate courts have published several opinions expanding upon
Gammill.
Gammill and Robinson both state that the factors listed in Robinson





56. 972 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. 1998).
57. Id. at 726.
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are not exclusive and may not apply to all types of expert testimony.58
Furthermore, the trial court should base its analysis of reliability on the
facts of the particular case.59 When the Robinson factors cannot be ap-
plied to the testimony at issue, the trial court must still satisfy rule 702's
reliability requirement. The test in such cases is whether "there is simply
too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion offered. '60
Therefore, in applying Gammill to expert testimony based upon experi-
ence or other specialized knowledge, Texas courts have conducted de-
tailed analyses of the basis for the expert's opinions and how those
opinions are tied to the facts of the case. It is important, therefore, that
experts provide a detailed description of their experience, training, and
methodology. Furthermore, non-scientific experts should walk the trial
court through each fact or step used in their analysis.
There are two important differences between the Texas courts' Robin-
son/Gammill analysis and federal courts' DaubertlKumho Tire analysis.
The first stems from Robinson's second factor, which is "the extent to
which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the ex-
pert. ' 61 This illogical Robinson factor seems to loom ominously over the
admissibility of expert testimony based upon experience and non-scien-
tific expertise, since all such testimony will be based in part on the ex-
pert's subjective interpretation. Yet Texas courts have not seized upon
this factor in any recent decisions. It appears that at least some Texas
intermediate appellate courts are more comfortable with the deferential
federal standard for admissibility of expert testimony.
The second major difference deals with appellate court review of trial
court determinations of reliability. Texas courts have tended to be less
deferential than their federal counterparts. While the Fifth Circuit looks
first to whether the trial court's methodology was arbitrary or capricious,
Texas appellate courts focus directly on the trial court's ultimate conclu-
sion. This stems from the Texas Supreme Court's lack of trust in trial
court determinations. But despite the Texas Supreme Court's lead, many
intermediate Texas appellate courts are also reviewing trial court reliabil-
ity determinations based upon a more lenient federal-type analysis.
An example of the application of Robinson to experience-based testi-
mony is the Austin Court of Appeals opinion in Olin Corp. v. Smith.62 In
Olin Corp., the plaintiff shot himself in the leg as a result of a "hangfire,"
which is an unusually long delay between the time when the hammer
strikes the ammunition and when the ammunition fires. Due to the injury
58. See Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557; see also supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
59. See Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557.
60. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 727 (quoting General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
146 (1997)).
61. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557.
62. 990 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied). See also City of Harlingen
v. Sharboneau, 1 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. granted) (applying
Robinson to the expert opinion of a real estate appraiser).
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sustained in the accidental shooting, the plaintiff lost his leg below the
knee. The jury awarded the plaintiff $5.7 million in actual damages.
During the trial, the plaintiff introduced the testimony of three experts:
Bill Wiseman, the gunsmith for the U.S. Olympic Team and the U.S.
Marines Corps rifle and pistol teams; Lester Roane, the chief engineer for
the world's largest and oldest independent testing laboratory for guns and
ammunition; and Reeves Jungkind, a retired firearms training officer with
the Texas Department of Public Safety. All three of the experts testified
that neither the plaintiff nor the gun itself could have caused the accident
and that ammunition-related hangfires of the duration described by the
eyewitnesses can and do occur with modern ammunition. The defendant
challenged the admissibility of these experts' opinions as unreliable under
Robinson.
Citing Gammill, the court noted that under Texas Rule of Evidence
702, the trial court must determine the relevance and reliability of all ex-
pert testimony before admitting it into evidence; however, the criteria for
assessing relevance and reliability vary depending on the nature of the
expert testimony being offered. 63 The factors set forth in Robinson "are
nonexclusive and will differ with each particular case and the nature of
the evidence offered."'64 While the Robinson factors apply specifically to
scientific evidence, other factors may apply when the testimony is based
upon "non-scientific" expert testimony. 65 When analyzing non-scientific
testimony, the court should use factors that help it to determine whether
the expert is a "professional witness" or a person whose opinion in the
courtroom would withstand the scrutiny of his professional peers.
66
The trial court heard extensive testimony on the plaintiff's experts'
qualifications based on years of experience in manufacturing firearms,
testing firearms, training others to use firearms, and actual observations
of ammunition-related hangfires of the duration described by the fact wit-
nesses. In light of the extensive evidence concerning the plaintiff's ex-
perts' experience with firearms, ammunition, and particularly hangfires, it
was not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting their
testimony.
While the Olin Corp. court allowed expert testimony based upon the
witnesses' experience with firearms, the Fourteenth District Court of Ap-
peals held in Houghton v. Port Terminal Railroad Ass'n that "[g]eneral
experience in a specialized field does not qualify a witness as an ex-
pert."' 67 The proponent of the expert testimony must establish that the
63. See Olin Corp., 990 S.W.2d at 795-96.
64. Id. at 795.
65. See id. at 789; see also Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726-27 (noting that experts may
testify "about specific defects and design changes based upon years of experience with the
product itself and others like it, a knowledge of the industry, and publications of the sub-
ject" when the bases for the testimony are shown to be reliable).
66. Olin Corp., 990 S.W.2d at 789.
67. 999 S.W.2d 39, 46 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.) (explaining
that while the plaintiff's expert had a lengthy career working on a railroad, the plaintiff
failed to show how the expert's experiences were connected to specific issues in the case).
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expert has experience regarding the specific issue before the court.68 This
language indicates that Texas courts hold experts to a higher standard
than the federal courts. Houghton conflicts with the Fifth Circuit's hold-
ing in Rushing that "[a]s long as some reasonable indication of qualifica-
tions is adduced,"69 the trial court's gatekeeping function is satisfied. It is
noteworthy that the plaintiffs' experts in Olin Corp. testified extensively
about their experiences not only with guns and ammunition, but with
hangfires specifically.
In Honeycutt v. KMart Corp.,70 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
took an approach more similar to the DaubertlKumho Tire federal stan-
dard when it found that an expert witness may testify based upon experi-
ence only. In such a case, the court held that Robinson's general
requirements of relevance and reliability apply, but that its specific fac-
tors do not. Honeycutt was injured in KMart while in the checkout line
next to the cart corral-the area where carts are kept near the front of
the store. Normally there are two rails separating the checkout line from
the carts, but on that day the upper rail was missing. Honeycutt was sit-
ting on the lower rail when a KMart employee pushed some additional
carts into the corral, causing the carts already there to move forward and
hit Honeycutt.
Honeycutt sought to introduce the testimony of Dr. Wayne Johnston, a
Ph.D. in industrial engineering with a specialty in human factors and
ergonomics. Dr. Johnston planned to testify that the lack of a top rail was
an invitation for customers to sit on the second rail and that the missing
rail was therefore an unreasonable risk and the proximate cause of the
accident. He would have further testified that KMart failed to properly
train its employee in returning the carts and that the employee did not
keep a proper lookout. Finally, the expert would have testified that
KMart's failure to replace the top rail constituted negligence and that
Honeycutt was not contributorily negligent. After a hearing on KMart's
motion to strike, the trial court excluded Dr. Johnston's testimony. 71 The
plaintiffs appealed the trial court's ruling and prepared a detailed bill of
review.
The appellate court cited Justice Hecht's opinion in Gammill, stating
that "all expert testimony, regardless of whether it can be analyzed using
the specific factors set forth in Robinson, must satisfy the Robinson stan-
dard for reliability and relevance. '72 Therefore, under rule 702, the court
must decide "(1) whether Dr. Johnston [is] qualified to testify, and (2) if
68. See id. (citing Broders v. Heiss, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153-54 (Tex. 1996)).
69. Rushing, 185 F.3d at 507.
70. 1 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. filed).
71. See id. at 240-41. KMart raised three grounds for excluding Dr. Johnston's testi-
mony. The trial court excluded his testimony without specifying on which ground it
granted the motion. The appellate court, therefore, analyzed all three, including the
Robinson challenge, since if any ground is supported by the evidence in such a situation,
the appellate court will affirm the trial court. See id. (citing Ortiz v. Spann, 671 S.W.2d 909,
914 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
72. Id. at 242.
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qualified, whether his testimony [meets] the relevancy and reliability re-
quirements of Robinson. '73
The appellate court first noted that Dr. Johnston was qualified to tes-
tify. Not only was he a Ph.D. in industrial engineering, but he had been
head of the safety engineering program at Texas A&M for twenty-four
years. He was published in the field of occupational safety and had con-
sulted with retail stores on safety. The court then turned to the issue of
whether Dr. Johnston's testimony was relevant and reliable.
Johnston testified through the bill of review that his testimony was
based upon his experience and expertise in the field and not on any scien-
tific testing or experimentation. The court concluded that "[w]hile Dr.
Johnston is qualified to testify as a scientific expert, it is obvious by his
testimony that his opinions are based upon his 'experience.' 74 The court
discussed Dr. Johnston's extensive experience in identifying hazards and
studying how humans act and react in certain situations. Due to Dr.
Johnston's "training and experience," the court concluded that Dr. John-
ston's opinions were admissible based upon "the general reliability princi-
ples of Robinson but not its specific factors. 7 5
In Kroger Co. v. Betancourt,76 the plaintiff, an employee of a Kroger
vendor, injured his back when he tried to move a straddle jack owned by
Kroger. A straddle jack is a device used to move pallets. Kroger pro-
vided the straddle jack to vendors to move products in the store. After
the plaintiff loaded the straddle jack, he tried to move it and it would not
budge. He gave it a push and herniated three discs in his back. Plaintiff
and his family sued Kroger, claiming negligence and gross negligence.
Plaintiff offered the testimony of Ralph Cox, an engineering expert,
who testified that: (1) the restraining rings on the straddle jack's axle
come off periodically and need to be replaced; (2) when the restraining
rings come off, the axle pin can become dislocated; (3) when the axle
becomes dislocated, the wheel will not move; and (4) Kroger did not per-
form proper maintenance, which would have prevented the accident.
Kroger appealed the trial court's admission of Cox's testimony based
upon Robinson. Kroger asserted that Cox did not have any experience
with this type of warehouse loader, did not perform a re-creation of the
accident, had never operated a straddle jack, and did not know the his-
tory of the straddle jack in question. Therefore, Kroger claimed, Cox's
testimony was not reliable.
When analyzing whether the trial court abused its discretion, the Four-
teenth District Court of Appeals first noted that "in non-scientific cases,
it is impossible to set out specific criteria for evaluating the reliability of
expert testimony."'77 The court then stated that Cox was an engineer with
73. Id.
74. Id. at 243.
75. Id. at 244.
76. 996 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
77. Id. at 362 (citing Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726).
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experience in mechanical equipment and that the axle and restraining
ring at issue in this case were "very simple."'78 Cox had based his opin-
ions on photographs of the straddle jack taken immediately after the law-
suit was filed, his inspection of the actual straddle jack and the facilities
where it was located, his examination of the straddle jack's maintenance
and operating manuals, his examination of the straddle jack's mainte-
nance records, and his review of a number of depositions. Having dis-
cussed Cox's opinion and the data upon which he based his opinion, the
court, without discussing any specific factors it considered, concluded that
"there is not too great an analytical gap between the data and Cox's
conclusion. 79
The Honeycutt and Kroger courts took the federal Daubert/Kumho Tire
view that juries can be trusted and that the trial court should allow ex-
perts to testify in all but the most obvious cases of unreliability. They
seem to reject the Texas Supreme Court's view that appellate courts
should micro-manage trial courts' admissibility determinations based
upon Robinson's more restrictive language.
Another example of a Texas appellate court applying what appears to
be a more deferential analysis is Lincoln Property Co. v. DeShazo.80 In
Deshazo, the plaintiff sued the owner of a parking lot where the plaintiff
was assaulted during a "college night" party at a bar on the premises.
The plaintiff introduced the testimony of a former police officer and se-
curity guard who testified that at least five security guards were required
in such a situation and that had there been five security guards, the plain-
tiff would not have been injured. He further testified that providing only
one security guard was gross negligence. After a judgment for the plain-
tiff in the trial court, the defendant appealed the admission of the expert's
testimony.
The DeShazo court acknowledged Robinson's ruling that the require-
ment of the trial court to make an initial determination whether the ex-
pert opinion testimony is relevant and reliable applies to all expert
testimony. 81 The court then stated that the Robinson factors are not an
exclusive nor exhaustive list and that the trial court's method to deter-
mine reliability is "dependent upon the subject matter of the case."'82
Apparently applying the more deferential federal standard, the court
held that the expert's opinions were reasonably reliable. The court then
quoted Daubert, stating that "the trial court's gatekeeping function under
Rule 702 has not replaced cross-examination as 'the traditional and ap-
propriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." 83 The ap-
pellate court agreed with the trial court that "Lincoln's contention about
the extent of [the expert's] expertise [was] simply a topic fit for proper
78. Id.
79. Id. at 363.
80. 4 S.W.3d 55 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
81. See id. at 58-59 (citing Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 728).
82. Id. at 59 (citing Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557).
83. Id. at 59 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).
[Vol. 53
CIVIL EVIDENCE
cross-examination . . . at the trial."' 84 The appellate court's decision to
uphold the admission of "shaky" evidence resulting from the use of the
more lenient federal standards demonstrates respect for both the trial
court and the jury.
In Weiss v. Mechanical Associated Services, Inc.,85 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals demonstrated how a rigid application of the Robinson
factors can result in the denial of the right to a trial by jury. Maria Weiss
and her coworkers began suffering chronic colds, watery eyes, nasal burn-
ing, and nose bleeds soon after South Texas Radiology Group (STRG)
moved into the floor below the office where they worked. There was also
a white dust throughout her office. The building management inspected
the ventilation system and discovered that STRG had improperly vented
its x-ray developer into the building's general exhaust system. The build-
ing management also discovered that the developer used acetic acid, sul-
fur dioxide, glutaraldehyde (a toxic substance), and ammonia in its
development process. Soon afterward, the building management in-
stalled a dedicated exhaust system. Most employees' symptoms then im-
proved. Weiss, however, did not experience the same improvement.
After being diagnosed with immune system dysfunction and cognitive im-
pairment, she sued STRG and Merry X-Ray Chemical Corporation, the
supplier of the chemicals.
After Weiss filed suit, the building's management hired two certified
industrial hygienists to conduct air quality surveys. The first hygienist
tested STRG's offices and concluded that if the chemicals from the devel-
opment process were currently in the air, they were at levels below that
which could be detected. The hygienist performed these tests, however,
after the new ventilation system had been installed. He also tested the
white dust and concluded that it contained aluminum and that aluminum
chloride precipitates during STRG's development process, thus linking
the dust found in Weiss's office to STRG. The second hygienist focused
on testing the building's exhaust system, noting unsealed gaps between
the floors and leaks in the exhaust system. He concluded that there was a
"very high probability" that STRG's x-ray developer contaminated
Weiss's office. 86 This second hygienist also found high levels of mold and
bacteria in the ventilation system.
Weiss retained two toxicologists as experts in the case. Both experts
noted that Weiss's symptoms were consistent with low-level exposure to
any of the four major chemical components of STRG's x-ray developer.
Both experts also concluded that within a reasonable degree of scientific
probability, Weiss's symptoms resulted from exposure to the chemicals
from STRG's x-ray developer, particularly glutaraldehyde, the most
toxic. Neither expert, however, could rule out the possibility that exces-
84. Id.
85. 989 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
86. Id. at 122.
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sive mold, fungi, and bacteria in the ventilation system caused Weiss's
symptoms.
STRG filed a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i) "no-evidence" mo-
tion for summary judgment, contending that there was no evidence that
Weiss was exposed to glutaraldehyde or that Weiss's illness was caused by
glutaraldehyde. Weiss responded with affidavits from the industrial hy-
gienists and toxicologists. The trial court granted STRG's motion and
rendered judgment. Weiss appealed to the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals, claiming that the trial court erred by not considering her experts'
testimony.
For the purpose of review, the Weiss court assumed the trial judge
based his opinion on a finding that Weiss's expert opinion evidence was
inadmissible under Robinson and reviewed that decision for abuse of dis-
cretion. With rather illogical reasoning, the court then applied the Robin-
son factors to the toxicology experts' clinical diagnoses and concluded
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Despite evidence that
glutaraldehyde is a highly toxic substance, the experts' opinions that
Weiss's symptoms were consistent with exposure to glutaraldehyde, and
the close temporal proximity of the exposure and the onset of symptoms,
the court found the toxicologists' clinical diagnoses to be unreliable.
Apparently treating the clinical diagnoses as scientific evidence, the
Weiss court stated that the toxicologists did not rely "on any particular
theories that had been or could be tested."' 87 The court pointed out that
the toxicologists assumed exposure when making their conclusion that
glutaraldehyde caused Weiss's injuries. This assumption bothered the
court, even though there was abundant evidence that such exposure had
actually occurred, including an office covered with white dust linked to
the development process by independent experts.
The Weiss court then attempted to apply the other Robinson factors,
noting that neither toxicologist compared Weiss to the subjects of any
epidemiological studies of the effects of glutaraldehyde and that neither
expert demonstrated that their method of diagnosing Weiss as suffering
from exposure to glutaraldehyde was generally accepted in the scientific
community. Finally, the court noted that the potential rate of error
seemed high because neither expert could rule out other causes of Weiss's
illness.
This rigid application of Robinson is not unusual in Texas courts. Even
Gammill clearly stated that although Robinson's requirement that expert
evidence must be reliable applies equally to all types of expert testimony,
"the considerations listed in Daubert and in Robinson ... cannot always
be used with other kinds of expert testimony." 88 Furthermore, "clinical
medicine necessarily evolves from a process of trial and error," and as
such, "has traditionally been granted some leeway in a determination of
87. Id. at 125.
88. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726.
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admissibility." 89 No such leeway was given in the Weiss opinion, and Ma-
ria Weiss was denied her day in court.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Kunze90 is another example of a court apply-
ing the Robinson factors where they apparently were not appropriate.
Because the standard of review is abuse of discretion, a trial court's exclu-
sion of an expert's testimony will rarely be overturned on appeal when it
applies the Robinson factors, even in situations where those factors may
not have been the most appropriate method for determining reliability.
In Kunze, the Beaumont Court of Appeals, citing Gammill and Kumho
Tire, upheld the trial court's exclusion of an out-of-court test that the de-
fendants contended showed that the accident could not have happened
the way the plaintiff described. The plaintiff in Kunze sued Sears, Roe-
buck and Emerson Electric Company for amputation injuries he received
while using a Craftsman ten-inch radial arm saw. The defendants offered
the testimony of a consultant who claimed to have conducted a test under
circumstances similar to those existing at the time of the accident as de-
scribed by the plaintiff.
The Kunze court began its analysis by stating that a test regarding how
the accident occurred is only admissible if "the trial court determines that
there is a substantial similarity between the test conditions and the acci-
dent conditions." 91 The court then listed the factors from Robinson and
the trial court's application of those factors, concluding that the trial
court had not abused its discretion.
The defendants argued that the Daubert and Robinson factors did not
apply to litigation testing and that they only needed to show the tests
were conducted under circumstances substantially similar to those pre-
sent at the time of the accident at issue. The court rejected the defend-
ants argument. Citing Kumho Tire, the court stated that the trial court's
gatekeeping function applies "not only to testimony based upon scientific
knowledge, but also testimony based upon technical or other specialized
knowledge. '92 The court went on to say that even if the Robinson factors
may not have been the most appropriate method for determining reliabil-
ity in such a situation, the abuse of discretion standard applies not only to
the trial court's ultimate decision on reliability, but also to the way the
court makes that decision. 93 A trial court abuses its discretion only if it
acts without reference to any guiding principles. 94 In this case, the trial
court's application of the Robinson factors was a "reasonable application
of appropriate guiding principles" 95 and not an abuse of discretion.
89. Green v. Texas Workers' Comp. Ins. Facility, 993 S.W.2d 839, 844 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1999, pet. denied).
90. 996 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, pet. filed).
91. Id. at 424.







A. TRADE SECRET PRIVILEGE
In In re Continental General Tire, Inc.,96 the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed for the first time the scope of Texas Rule of Evidence 507, which
protects trade secrets from disclosure. Rule 507 states:
A person has a privilege, which may be claimed by the person or the
person's agent or employee, to refuse to disclose and to prevent
other persons from disclosing a trade secret owned by the person, if
the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or other-
wise work injustice. When disclosure is directed, the judge shall take
such protective measure as the interests of the holder of the privilege
and of the parties and the furtherance of justice may require. 97
The court held that "when a party resisting discovery establishes that
the requested information is a trade secret, under rule 507 the burden
shifts to the requesting party to establish that the information is necessary
for a fair adjudication of its claim or defense. '98 If the requesting party
satisfies that burden, then the trial court should order discovery of the
information, subject to an appropriate protective order.99 The court
stated that rule 507 is a balancing test'00 between two competing inter-
ests.10' First, the privilege recognizes that trade secrets are an important
property interest worthy of protection. Second, the exception to the priv-
ilege to prevent fraud or injustice recognizes the importance of the fair
adjudication of claims. "The trial court must weigh the degree of the re-
questing party's need for the information with the potential harm of dis-
closure to the resisting party.' 0 2 Factors weighing against disclosure
include the potential inadequacies of a protective order and any "fact-
based grounds" for believing that the requesting party will violate the
protective order.10 3
96. 979 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
97. TEX. R. EviD. 507 (emphasis added).
98. Continental Gen. Tire, 979 S.W.2d at 610. The court also articulated the test for
disclosure under rule 507 as information that is "material and necessary to the litigation
and unavailable from any other source." Id. at 615 (quoting Automatic Drilling Mach., Inc.
v. Miller, 515 S.W.2d 256 (Tex.*1974)).
99. See id. at 613.
100. See id. at 612-13.
101. See id. at 612.
102. Id. at 613. For an example of the balancing test being applied by the lower courts
after Continental Gen. Tire, see In re Leviton Mfg. Co., 1 S.W.3d 898 (Tex. App.-Waco,
1999, orig. proceeding) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion because the re-
questing party did not meet its burden under rule 507 to show that the information was
necessary to a fair adjudication of the claim); In re Frost, 998 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App.-
Waco 1999, orig. proceeding) (holding that it was not necessary for the fair adjudication of
the plaintiff's claims in a contract dispute that the plaintiff have the defendant's customer
list in order to discuss the defendant's "custom and trade and usage" with the defendant's
customers)-




In In re Marketing Investors Corp.,104 the Dallas Court of Appeals de-
cided for the first time in Texas whether the attorney-client privilege ap-
plies against a former corporate officer who had access to the documents
at issue while serving in that capacity. In Marketing Investors, the com-
pany fired its president and instructed him to leave the premises immedi-
ately. He left but returned the next day and removed company
documents from his office. Five days later the company sued the former
president under various fraud, negligence, and breach of contract claims.
During discovery, the company discovered that the former president had
privileged documents and requested that he return them. He refused,
claiming that because he was allowed to possess and view the documents
while president of the company, his current possession of them did not
violate the privilege.10 5
The court stated that in a corporation's affairs, "there is but one cli-
ent-the corporation,"106 and "only the corporation may permit access to
its attorney-client communications. 10 7 The court pointed out that the
"[c]orporation is a separate legal entity and should not lose its valuable
legal rights because it can only act though its employees.' 08 The court
then held that when "a former officer or director... seek[s] documents in
a personal capacity, not a fiduciary capacity, [he] does not act as 'manage-
ment' . . . [a]nd has 'no authority to pierce or otherwise frustrate the
attorney-client privilege when such action conflicts with the will of man-
agement."' 109 As such, when the company fired the president, he lost all
rights to view or possess any of the company's privileged documents.
Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering the former
president to return the documents.
In In re Texas Farmers Insurance Exchange,110 the Texarkana Court of
Appeals held that when an insurance company hires an attorney to con-
duct a routine claim investigation, the communication between the law-
yer and insurance company about the results of the investigation do not
fall under the attorney-client privilege.111 The plaintiffs in Texas Farmers
sued their insurance company to recover for fire damage to their house.
Shortly after the plaintiffs made a claim, the insurance company hired a
lawyer to take sworn statements from the plaintiffs and provide the insur-
ance company with a summary of the statements and his recommenda-
104. No. 05-98-00535-CV, slip op., 1998 WL 909895 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Dec. 31, 1998,
orig. proceeding).
105. See id. at *3. The former president also asserted the joint-defense privilege under
Texas Rule of Evidence 503(d)(5). The court held that since there was nothing to indicate
that any attorney of the corporation had represented the president personally, the joint-
defense exception did not apply. See id. at *4.
106. See id.
107. Id. at *5.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *4 (quoting Milroy v. Hanson, 875 F. Supp. 646, 649-50 (D. Neb. 1995)).
110. 990 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding).
111. See id. at 341.
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tions. During discovery, the plaintiffs requested the attorney's deposition
and all files, reports, and documents in his possession related to the case.
The trial court concluded that the attorney had acted as an investigator
and not as an attorney and ordered him to produce most of the
documents.' 12
The appellate court upheld the trial court's conclusion that the attorney
was acting as an investigator. The court held that communications be-
tween the insurance company and the attorney, while acting as an investi-
gator, were not privileged. The court explained that if such
communications between an attorney and an insurance company were
privileged, "insurance companies could simply hire attorneys as investiga-
tors at the beginning of a claim investigation and claim privilege to all the
information gathered." 11 3 The court noted, however, that if the attorney
and the insurance company could demonstrate that the attorney made
some of the communications in his capacity as an attorney, those commu-
nications would be privileged. This privilege would not extend to an anal-
ysis of the facts made by the attorney in his capacity as an investigator,
but would extend to "legal strategy, assessments, and conclusions." 1 14
C. PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE
The Texas Health and Safety Code and the Texas Medical Practices Act
both create a medical peer review privilege in Texas. 1l5 The Texas Health
and Safety Code states that all "records and proceedings of a medical
committee" are privileged. 1 6 The privilege extends to any documents
created at the direction of the committee in order to conduct its re-
view.117 The Texas Medical Practices Act provides that "all proceedings
and records of a peer review committee" are privileged.'18 Under the
Medical Practices Act, a peer review committee is any committee acting
pursuant to approved hospital bylaws to evaluate the "quality of medical
and health-care services or the competence of a physician."' 1 9 Neither
privilege extends to documents that were gratuitously submitted to the
committee "without committee impetus and purpose."120 Thus, mere
112. See TEX. R. EviD. 503(a). Rule 503 only protects communication between a client
and lawyer when the communication is made "for the purpose of facilitating the rendition
of professional legal services." Id.
113. Texas Farmers, 990 S.W.2d at 341.
114. Id.
115. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032 (Vernon 2000); TEX. Occ.
CODE ANN. § 160.007 (Vernon 2000).
116. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032(a) (Vernon 2000) ("[R]ecords
and proceedings of a medical committee are confidential and are not subject to court
subpoena.").
117. See Jordan v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 701 S.W.2d 644, 647-48 (Tex. 1985); see also
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032(b) (Vernon 2000).
118. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 160.007(a) (Vernon 2000) ("Each proceeding or record
of a medical peer review committee is confidential, and any communication made to a
medical peer review committee is privileged.").
119. Memorial Hosp.-The Woodlands v. McCown, 927 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. 1996).
120. See Jordan, 701 S.W.2d at 648.
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consideration by a hospital peer review committee does not make a docu-
ment privileged.121 Also, the privilege does not apply to documents kept
in the ordinary course of business. 122
Peer review is an often-litigated privilege in medical malpractice cases.
The information protected by the privilege is almost by definition rele-
vant to the plaintiff's case. Defendants try to shoehorn as much informa-
tion into the privilege as possible. The most litigated issue is whether the
documents at issue were created at the direction of the peer review com-
mittee or simply reviewed by the peer review committee and thus not
privileged.
In In re WHMC d/b/a Columbia West Houston Medical Center, 23 the
plaintiffs were denied discovery of documents related to the hospital's
"performance improvement project," which the hospital initiated to de-
crease the amount of time patients spent waiting in the emergency room.
The plaintiffs sued West Houston Medical Center after their infant
daughter died from dehydration. The plaintiffs contended that the four-
hour wait in the emergency room before receiving treatment contributed
to their daughter's death. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion to
compel production.
The appellate court granted the hospital's writ of mandamus, holding
that the documents requested were within the peer review privilege. 124
The hospital had submitted an affidavit by the hospital's risk manager,
along with a copy of the hospital's bylaws, stating that an Emergency
Room Special Care Committee and a Medical Executive Committee had
been formed under the hospital's bylaws to evaluate health care services
and improve patient care.125 The affidavit went on to say that those com-
mittees directed the creation of all of the contested documents. Because
the hospital's evidence established that the documents were privileged,
the burden shifted back to the plaintiff to offer controverting proof.
Since the plaintiffs had no such proof to offer, the appellate court con-
cluded that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the document
production.
An example of a defendant trying to shoehorn all it can into the peer
review privilege is the case of In re Pack.126 In Pack, a nursing home
defendant argued that investigation reports of the nursing home prepared
by the Texas Department of Human Services (TDHS), the nursing
home's response to that report laying out its plan to correct its deficien-
cies, and the testimony of TDHS employees who conducted the investiga-
tion, all fall under the peer review privilege. 127 The Fort Worth Court of
Appeals disagreed.
121. See Texarkana Mem'il Hosp. v. Jones, 551 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Tex. 1977).
122. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032(c) (Vernon 2000).
123. 996 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding).
124. See id. at 413.
125. See id.
126. 996 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, orig. proceeding).
127. See id. at 5.
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The underlying case was a wrongful death and survival action alleging
that James Watson died as a result of neglect in the nursing home. Thirty-
six days after he was admitted to the nursing home, Watson was trans-
ferred to a hospital where he later died. While he was in the hospital, two
hospital employees who treated Watson notified TDHS about possible
abuse and neglect by the nursing home. Two TDHS employees inspected
the nursing home and prepared a report. The nursing home responded to
the report with a plan of correction. After filing suit, the plaintiffs re-
quested the trial court to compel the nursing home to produce TDHS
records in response to a document request and filed deposition notices
for the two investigating TDHS employees. The trial court denied the
motion to compel, quashed the deposition notices, and ordered the plain-
tiffs not to use any of the TDHS documents, holding that the TDHS in-
vestigation fell under the peer review privilege. 128
On mandamus review, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the
TDHS investigation did not fall under the peer review privilege. The
Medical Practice Act provides in part: "Unless disclosure is required or
authorized by law, a record or determination of or a communication to a
medical peer review committee is not subject to subpoena or discovery
and is not admissible as evidence in any civil judicial or administrative
proceeding .... -129 Under the Texas Administrative Code, licensed
nursing homes are required to post TDHS licensing inspection reports,
deficiency sheets, plans of correction, and TDHS summaries of inspection
and complaint investigations "at the facility for public inspection." 130
These were the documents at issue. The appellate court held that these
documents could not fall under the peer review privilege because their
disclosure "is required or authorized by law. '131
IV. MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS OF NOTE
A. RELEVANCY
1. Relevancy in General
In Green v. Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Facility,'32 the
plaintiff alleged that he had become incapacitated as a result of chemical
exposure on the job. The jury found that the plaintiff had contracted an
occupational disease, but that he was not incapacitated. During trial, the
plaintiff attempted to introduce the testimony of his primary treating
physician, Dr. Rea, a board certified specialist in environmental
medicine, on the issues of causation and incapacity. The defendant chal-
lenged the reliability of Dr. Rea's testimony, citing several sources that
tended to discredit environmental medicine as a discipline and two fed-
128. See id. at 6.
129. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 160.007(e) (Vernon 2000) (emphasis added).
130. 40 TEx. ArMIN. CODE §§ 19.1921(e)(3), (h) (1998).
131. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 160.007(e) (Vernon 2000).
132. 993 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied).
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eral cases that rejected Dr. Rea's "multiple chemical sensitivity" theory
as unreliable. 133 The trial court initially excluded only the causation testi-
mony, but then expanded its ruling to exclude all testimony by Dr. Rea,
including any testimony in his capacity as the plaintiff's treating
physician.
The Green court assumed that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion with respect to excluding Dr. Rea's expert testimony on causation.
134
But the court remanded the case for a new trial based upon the trial
court's improper exclusion of Dr. Rea's testimony as a fact witness. As
the plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Rea regularly saw the plaintiff over a
seven-year period. During that time, Dr. Rea regularly recorded the
plaintiff's symptoms and discussed them with the plaintiff. Dr. Rea's tes-
timony was therefore relevant to the issue of incapacity. 135 Due to the
exclusion of Dr. Rea's testimony, there was no testimony of any doctor
who treated the plaintiff after 1990-a seven-year gap between time of
the last treatment in evidence and the trial. Therefore, the Green court
held that the trial court had improperly excluded relevant evidence and
that the exclusion of that evidence probably caused the rendition of an
improper verdict. 136
In Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Driscol,137 the plaintiffs sued a
debt collection agency for negligence, gross negligence, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, and violation of the Texas Fair Debt Collec-
tions Practices Act. The action arose out of the defendant's employees
calling the plaintiffs several times a day at odd hours and being abusive
on the phone. After an $11.7 million verdict for the plaintiffs, almost all
of which was punitive damages, the defendant appealed the trial court's
decision to allow plaintiffs' counsel to ask Household's debt collection
manager if he had knowledge of the $3 million in judgments against
Household for abusive collection practices in California. The appellate
court held that since the plaintiff alleged gross negligence, malice, and
willful conduct, the manager's knowledge of the judgments, which would
indicate that he had knowledge of the consequences of Household's ac-
tions, was relevant and admissible.138
133. See id. at 843 (citing Bradley v. Brown, 852 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ind. 1994), aff'd, 42
F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 1994) and Summers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Sys., 897 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.
Okla. 1995)).
134. While the appellate court apparently disagreed with the trial court's decision on
the admissibility of Dr. Rea's causation testimony, the standard of review is whether the
trial court abused its discretion. See id. at 842. The court noted that "clinical medicine
necessarily evolves from a process of trial and error," and as such, "has traditionally been
granted some leeway in a determination of admissibility." Id. at 844.
135. See TEX. R. EvID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.").
136. See Green, 993 S.W.2d at 844-45.
137. 989 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, pet. denied).
138. See id. at 96.
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2. Evidence of Insurance
In St. Joseph Hospital v. Wolff,1 3 9 the Austin Court of Appeals re-
viewed a trial court's decision to admit evidence of insurance. St. Joseph
established an Integrated Surgical Residency Program with the Central
Texas Medical Foundation, a nonprofit organization whose physicians
treat patients at Brackenridge Hospital in Austin. Through the program,
St. Joseph assigns its surgical residents to train at Brackenridge. Due to
the negligence of one of these residents, Stacy Wolff suffered severe brain
damage. All of the defendants in the case settled except St. Joseph,
which the Wolff family sued under a theory of joint enterprise. The jury
awarded Stacy Wolff $8 million and her parents each $750,000 for past
and future damages.
Because the plaintiff pleaded that St. Joseph was a participant in a joint
enterprise through the Integrated Program, the trial court admitted evi-
dence that St. Joseph provided the resident with medical malpractice in-
surance that would cover incidents occurring while the resident was part
of that program. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision to
admit the evidence of insurance. 140 "While insurance cannot be offered
to prove that a person acted negligently, evidence of insurance is admissi-
ble 'when offered for another issue, such as proof of agency, ownership,
or control.' "1 4 1
3. Offers to Compromise
In Tarrant County v. English,142 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals dis-
cussed the admissibility of settlement offers for a purpose other than to
prove liability. Under Texas Rule of Evidence 408, an offer to "compro-
mise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount is not
admissible to prove liability."'1 43 But rule 408 "does not require exclusion
when the evidence is offered for another purpose."'1 44 In English, the
court concluded that one such other purpose is to establish "that state-
ments made during negotiations were misrepresentations.' 45
English sued Tarrant County for damages he suffered when diesel fuel
migrated from the county's property and contaminated his land. The
county conducted tests on its adjoining land in April 1991. Those tests
revealed high levels of contamination. In May of that year, however, the
county sent English a letter stating that test results on its property were
"inconclusive," but offered to clear away any contaminated soil on En-
139. 999 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. granted).
140. The trial court included the following limiting instruction: "Evidence that [the resi-
dent] was or was not insured against liability is not admissible on the issue of whether he
acted negligently. It is admitted solely on the issue of right to control." Id. at 595.
141. Id. (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 411).
142. 989 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied).
143. TEX. R. EVID. 408.
144. Id.
145. English, 989 S.W.2d at 377.
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glish's property in exchange for release of all claims.146 At trial, English
introduced the letter, over the county's objection, to show that the county
had misrepresented its knowledge about the contamination on its own
property by not telling him in the letter about the April test results. The
appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the settlement offer because it could have reasonably con-
cluded that the county was trying to mislead English. 147
B. HEARSAY
1. Learned Treatise
In Kahanek v. Rogers,148 the plaintiffs' seven-year-old daughter, who
had a history of heart problems, died as a result of an elevated level of an
anti-seizure drug that caused a cardiac arrest. The plaintiffs sued the
child's doctors for negligently failing to monitor the level of the drug in
the child's blood. The Physician's Desk Reference (PDR) stated that the
drug should not be given to heart patients until after a "critical benefit-to-
risk appraisal."' 149 The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's decision to
classify the PDR as a learned treatise under Texas Rule of Evidence
803(18) instead of as a market report under rule 803(17).
The difference is significant. Under rule 803(18), a learned treatise
may be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit.150 In
other words, the jury cannot take a learned treatise into the deliberation
room. A learned treatise is only admissible in conjunction with an ex-
pert's testimony.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's classifica-
tion of the PDR as a learned treatise. The court noted that the rule
803(17) market report exception applies when the information is "readily
ascertainable and about which there can be no real dispute." 151 The
court went on to say that "the compilation of drug information embodied
by the [PDR] goes beyond objective information to items on which
learned professionals could disagree in good faith. '152
2. Public Records
Horizons/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld153 is another nursing home
case dealing with TDHS inspection reports. In Auld, the plaintiffs filed a
survival action alleging that the decedent died as a result of the negli-
gence and gross negligence of the nursing home where the decedent was
a bedridden resident. After the defense closed, the plaintiffs sought to
146. Id. at 378.
147. See id.
148. 12 S.W.3d 501 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet. h.).
149. Id. at 502.
150. See id. at 504.
151. Id. (citing 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 803(17), at 803-
360 (rev. ed. 1994)).
152. Id.
153. 985 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. granted).
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introduce as rebuttal evidence thirteen survey reports prepared by the
TDHS. These survey reports were created by "surveyors" during their
inspections of the defendant's nursing home. The defendant objected
based on hearsay and Texas Rule of Evidence 403. Specifically, the de-
fendant alleged that the survey inspections were used to determine
whether the nursing home complied with state licensing requirements and
federal and state Medicaid requirements and not whether the nursing fol-
lowed the proper standard of care.
The court first noted that the reports fell under the rule 803(8) public
records exception to the hearsay rule. The factual findings in the reports
resulted "from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law."'1 54 As to the complaint that the records were unduly prejudicial, the
court held that the nursing home opened the door for the documents'
admission. The trial court observed that the nursing home's witnesses
testified that no patient ever failed to receive basic care. The survey re-
ports listed incidents in which patients did fail to receive basic care.
Moreover, the incident reports showed that the defendant had subjective
knowledge that patient care was suffering. That subjective knowledge
was relevant to the issue of gross negligence. 15 5 Thus, the survey reports
were admissible. 156
3. Death Bed Videos
In Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. Walters,157 Douglas Walters brought a
product liability action against Pittsburgh Corning Corporation (PCC),
alleging that when Walters was in the Navy working to build nuclear sub-
marines in the 1960s, he was exposed to Unibestos, a substance contain-
ing asbestos manufactured by PCC. Walters was diagnosed with
mesothelioma, a cancer caused by asbestos exposure, in 1994. He died
later that year, ten days after filing suit. The trial court found PCC liable
under theories of negligence and gross negligence for the production of
an unreasonably dangerous product without sufficient warnings. The trial
court awarded Walters's estate, wife, and parents a total of $8.8 million.
Plaintiffs introduced a "death-bed video" of Walters taken four days
before he died. The video showed a gaunt and feeble Walters lying in bed
and walking around the hospital supporting himself with an intravenous
pole on wheels. Throughout the video, Walters described the agonizing
pain he was suffering. The video was a four-and-a-half-minute edited
compilation of the original video, which was an hour and a half long.
154. TEX, R. Evii. 803(8)(C).
155. See Horizon/CMS, 985 S.W.2d at 227.
156. See id.; see also Brewer v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 986 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (holding that TDHS inspection reports of defendant's nursing
homes were admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(8) as public records and under
rules 803 (1), (3), & (4) as present sense impressions relating to patients' then-existing
mental, emotional, or physical conditions or statements made for the purpose of receiving
medical care).
157. 1 S.W.3d 759 (Tex, App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet. h.).
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PCC objected to the videotape's audio as hearsay and on Texas Rule of
Evidence 403 grounds. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals first over-
ruled the defendant's point of error based on hearsay. The court stated
that Walters's videotape testimony was admissible under the rule 803(3)
exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 803(3) provides that a statement is
not excluded as hearsay if the statement is of "the declarant's then ex-
isting state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health). '15 8
The court conceded that statements falling under this exception are usu-
ally spontaneous remarks made by the declarant while experiencing a
sensation that is not readily apparent by a third party, but noted that this
requirement is not stated in the rule's language. 159
PCC also asserted that the responses Walters gave on the video were
staged responses to the questions asked by Walters's lawyer and not
spontaneous. Therefore, argued PCC, the statements on the video were
inadmissible hearsay. The appellate court disagreed. It found that Wal-
ters was explaining the pain that he was enduring at the time of the video.
He was thus describing his "then existing . . . physical condition. '160
Without his description, the jury would have seen Walters's poor physical
condition, but would have been unaware of the extent of the pain he was
suffering. The court stated that if it adopted PCC's assertion concerning
the inadmissibility of staged responses, "any statement ever made in re-
sponse to even the simplest question would immediately become inadmis-
sible hearsay."161
The court then turned to PCC's rule 403 objection, explaining that
while such testimony may arouse sympathy in the jury, Walters's condi-
tion prior to death was a necessary part of his wife's and the estate's case.
Furthermore, the tape was Walters's only opportunity to tell the jury
about his condition, since he died shortly after the tape was made. There-
fore, the tape had sufficient probative value to outweigh any prejudicial
effects. 162
C. OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE
Also in Pittsburgh Corning, PCC appealed the admission of the plain-
tiffs' experts' opinions that the defendants were negligent and grossly
negligent. The plaintiffs introduced the testimony of several physicians
who testified about the dangers of asbestos, its established links in the
158. TEX. R. EVID. 803(3).
159. See Pittsburgh Corning, 1 S.W.3d at 771-72 (citing Ochs v. Martinez, 789 S.W.2d
949, 959 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied)).
160. TEx. R. EvID. 803(3).
161. Pittsburgh Corning, 1 S.W.3d at 772.
162. See id. ("The fact that evidence has some prejudicial effect is insufficient to war-
rant its exclusion. Instead, there must be a demonstration that introduction of the evi-
dence would be unfairly prejudicial to the objecting party. Moreover, to be excluded,
'evidence must not only create a danger of unfair prejudice, but such danger must substan-
tially outweigh its relevance."' (citing John Deere Co. v. May, 773 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1989, writ denied)).
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scientific community to mesothelioma, and the dangers of asbestos
known in the 1960s. The appellate court overruled PCC's appeal of the
trial court's admission of this expert testimony under rule 702. The court
then took up PCC's appeal of the trial court's admission of expert opin-
ions under rule 704 that PCC was negligent or grossly negligent. 163 The
court noted that under rule 704, a witness may give testimony in the form
of an opinion on a subject embracing an ultimate issue to be decided by
the jury. 164 An expert may therefore give his or her opinion as to the
defendant's negligence or gross negligence as long as the expert is pro-
vided with the proper legal standard as a predicate. 165 Since the wit-
nesses in this case were given the proper legal standards before they
testified that the defendant was negligent and grossly negligent, their
opinions were admissible under rule 704.166
V. CONCLUSION
The developments in civil evidence over the survey period demonstrate
the ongoing debate in our civil justice system over the role of juries in
deciding complex issues in a structured setting. When the structure be-
comes the focal point for determining fairness instead of the jury's collec-
tive wisdom, the right to trial by jury erodes into irrelevance. Judicial
activism protected by an abuse of discretion standard is now called by
other names-Daubert and Robinson. Instead of privilege walls being
scaled down by an enlightened judiciary and legislature, they are being
reinforced in the name of commercial efficiency. More than ever, Texas
citizens need judges that believe in the right to trial by jury and in the
jury's ability to fairly weigh all the evidence within the context of our
modern society against all its competing interests.
163. See TEX. R. EvID. 704 ("Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference other-
wise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact.").
164. See Pittsburgh Corning, 1 S.W.3d at 776-77.
165. See id. at 777.
166. See id.
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